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MAY OFFICIALS THINK RELIGIOUSLY?
FREDERICK SCHAUER*

I.

In a society that professes allegiance to the principle of separation of church and state, must that separation take place in
thought as well as in deed? Professor Greenawalt argues persuasively that, even in a liberal democracy, citizen reliance on religious beliefs is permissible in making decisions regarding those issues for which rational argument alone provides no solution. If
citizens may rely on the "nonrational" in thinking about issues of
public policy, then they ought to be allowed to rely on that particular subset of the nonrational that is designated "religious."
Citizen preferences, however, do not translate directly into governmental action. In a representative democracy, numerous decisions are in fact made by legislators, judges, executives, administrators, and bureaucrats. It is fair to assume that individuals
performing such functions have what John Simmons refers to as
"positional duties"-that is, obligations with respect to a particular position that differ from, or exceed, the obligations one may
have as citizen simpliciter. When one assumes the role of a police
officer, for example, one takes on special responsibilities actively to
enforce the law, and when one assumes the role of legislator one
becomes disabled from receiving gratuities for services rendered
that we would not think impermissible for a waiter or taxi driver.
As a general and preliminary matter, therefore, government officials of various types might very well be disabled from doing things
as government officials that would be entirely permissible for them
to do as mere citizens in a liberal democracy.
Thus, even if Professor Greenawalt correctly concludes that citizens in a liberal democracy may rely on religious principles in
making decisions regarding a wide range of public policy matters,
it does not follow that government officials may do the same thing
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
1. A. SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS 12-23 (1979).
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in exercising their official roles. Professor Greenawalt recognizes
this as a separate question, but hints that for him the answer
would be the same. At the conclusion of his paper, he notes that
the view that legislators "sometimes can develop their own political positions" in reliance on religious convictions is a "fairly short"
step,2 and that "[t]he conclusion that legislation adopted on such
grounds does not offend the religion guarantees of the Constitution
is another fairly short step."'
Because I am in substantial agreement with Professor Greenawalt's major thesis concerning the permissibility of citizen reliance
on religious convictions, I want to look more closely not at the thesis itself, but rather at these extrapolations to official action that,
for him, are only short steps. I want to suggest not only that these
steps are not that short, but also that they may be steps in the
wrong direction. Perhaps implicit in the notion of a liberal democracy and in the establishment clause of the first amendment are
positional obligations of officials that preclude them from relying
on the very religious grounds on which they would be entitled to
rely were they merely citizens deciding what political positions to
hold. If officials have these positional duties, then perhaps they are
obliged to rely on secular rather than religious reasons even within
the realm of nonrational decision, the terrain on which Professor
Greenawalt stakes his claim.
II.
If the analysis were to proceed entirely as an exercise in ideal
theory,4 the question of official reliance on religious convictions,
2. Greenawalt, The Limits of Rationality and the Place of Religious Conviction: Protecting Animals and the Environment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1011, 1065 (1986).

3. Id.
4. I avoid the distinction between theory and practice precisely because good theory will
reflect actual practice. A theory that does not accurately reflect reality is, quite simply, a
bad theory. See I. KANT, ON THE OLD SAW: THAT MAY BE RIGHT IN THEORY BUT IT WON'T
WORK IN PRACTICE (E. Ashton trans. 1974). Nevertheless, it is often philosophically useful to
imagine a world consisting entirely of rational or just decisionmakers, or a world in which
some other admittedly unrealistic behavioral assumption is used to help focus the philosophical question. This is the point of Rawls' distinction between ideal theory and nonideal
theory, and it is this distinction that is most useful here. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 8-9,
245-47, 351-52 (1971); see also Radin, Risk of Error Rules and Non-Ideal Justification, in
NOMOS XXVIII: JUSTIFICATION 33 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1986).
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whether those of the officials or those of their constituencies, might
very well focus on the obligations of officials to act in ways that
promote or seek some common ground. If the positional obligations
of some officials are positional obligations with respect to the polity as a whole and to the state as an institution, rather than merely
obligations to act as mouthpieces for voters in certain geographic
areas, then officials may be obliged to rely on reasons for acting
that transcend even the legitimate beliefs of only a subset of society. This is not to say that officials, even in the area of the nonrational, must never choose one nonrational position over another.
Nor is it to say that these officials, in the exercise of their positional obligations as representatives of others, cannot incorporate
into their decisions some of the nonrational preferences of their
constituencies. Perhaps implicit in the idea of a liberal democracy,
however, is an obligation of or an official to rely on reasons not
that necessarily are held by all of the people, but that could be
held by all of the people. Religious argument, to the extent that it
intrinsically appeals to and includes those who share common religious presuppositions while simultaneously excluding those who do
not subscribe to certain religious tenets, may very well fail this
test. Religious argument may ultimately require addressees of the
argument either to disagree or to give up their religious faith, in a
way that secular argument in the realm of the nonrational does
not. Religious decisionmaking by an official, therefore, may be of a
different order than other forms of choosing between courses of action, even on nonrational grounds, and for that reason religious
decisionmaking may be inconsistent with the obligations of an official in a liberal democracy.
At this point, the reference to "officials" becomes unacceptably
general. If positional obligations are referred to those obligations
plainly may vary with the position, and some officials occupy positions different from those occupied by others. Consider, for example, the obligations of a United States Senator from Massachusetts, the United States Attorney for the District of Massachusetts,
an employee of the Internal Revenue Service's Boston Regional Office, and the commanding officer of the United States Army post at
Fort Devens, Massachusetts. Similar examples could be drawn for
state officials that would demonstrate that particular officials may
have obligations to reflect particular constituencies that do not
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parallel the obligations of public officials in general. Although
elected legislators are entitled to filter the views of their constituencies to some extent, clearly the views of those constituencies play
more of a part in a proper conception of these officials' legislative
roles than they do with respect to members of the executive, judicial, or administrative branches of government. 5 Professor Greenawalt's small step thus may be small for the legislator but quite a
bit larger for individuals whose official roles are not as easily defined in terms of constituent representation.
Exploring the full ramifications of this perspective is not my
purpose here, and I couched the previous paragraphs in the subjunctive precisely because I want to leave the realm of ideal theory.
Instead, I wish to assume that, as a matter of ideal theory, legislators and perhaps even some other public officials could legitimately
rely on religious convictions with respect to some governmental decisions. This assumption made, I want to exit the arena of ideal
theory, and look to the effect of a publicly acknowledged norm of
official behavior that gives approval to reliance on religion with respect to at least some governmental decisions. The focus now is
more behavioral than philosophical, and thus what I say here is
necessarily contingent on my own nonscientific assessment of how
other people think and behave. If my behavioral speculation is correct, then certain conclusions will follow inevitably. Even if I am
wrong, however, I hope at least to outline how the inquiry must
proceed.
III.
When contemplating the relationship of religion to politics,
many people have their own favorite fears. That is, it is common
when talking about this subject to refer to some particular conflation of religion and politics that all would consider condemnable.
Some might think of the worst excesses of religious zeal in modern
5. I am not claiming that the conception that legislators are articulators of constituent
views is the only plausible conception of a legislator's role in a representative democracy. I
am saying merely that it is one such conception and that, under any version of that conception, the legislator's obligation to articulate constituent views, even if based on religious
grounds, is greatest. As one departs from this conception of the legislative role, or considers
officials other than legislators, one may find that the permissibility of reliance by officials on
their own religious convictions decreases commensurately.
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theocracies, and warn against the possibility of becoming another
Iran in the grip of an Ayatollah. More realistically, some fear an
environment in which the criminal law would prohibit all that is
anathema to a particular religion and nothing that is not, in which
public officials would use their preferred access to the media and
other forums as an occasion to proselytize for religious views, in
which authorities would use society's educational institutions to
stress the advantages of some religions and the disadvantages of
others, and in which a religious oath would become the effective
prerequisite for holding various official positions. 6
I emphasize that I am not claiming that Professor Greenawalt
would view these hypothetical eventualities as any less dangerous
than I. In fact, my point is precisely that, as to these and other
examples, I assume he would agree with me that these are consequences to be avoided. The question then can be made more precise. Using terminology I have introduced elsewhere, 7 I want to refer to the assumed permissible reliance on religion by public
officials as the instant case. Let us assume, therefore, that Professor Greenawalt's small step is a proper one and that, in the area of
nonrational decisionmaking, legislators and other public officials
may develop their own political positions and tlien take official action based on those positions, with reference to religious considerations. In contrast, we must imagine a danger case, such as the ones
mentioned previously, in which religious involvement in political
life is plainly excessive, unjustified, and inconsistent with the basic
ideals of a liberal democratic society.
We now can focus more clearly on the central question in moving from ideal to nonideal theory. Is the likelihood of the danger
case especially great if the first step to the instant case is taken or
can the instant case be accepted with no greater risks than those

6. Of course, article VI, clause 3, of the United States Constitution prohibits any "religious Test," and this provision, when combined with the first amendment, precludes the
states and the federal government from engaging in "the historically and constitutionally
discredited policy of probing religious beliefs by test oaths or limiting public offices to persons who have, or perhaps more properly profess to have, a belief in some particular kind of
religious concept." Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 494 (1961) (footnote omitted). Nevertheless, what is prohibited by law could become required by the political process, in slightly
less direct ways.
7. Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARv. L. REV. 361 (1985).
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normally attendant to the uncertainties of the future and of
human behavior? Is the move from the first step into the chasm
merely a risk, like many others, that any power may be abused or
taken too far,8 or does some particular reason exist to suppose that
in the case of separation of church and state the likelihood of slipping from that which is tolerable to that which is not particularly
great?
One of the first factors to examine is the extent to which Professor Greenawalt's analysis requires the concept of rationality to
bear virtually all of the weight in separating the areas in which
religious factors properly may be part of a public official's analysis
from the areas in which decisions, in his view, must be entirely
secular. I am by no means denying the rational/nonrational distinction.9 Instead, I am questioning the transferability of the
rational/nonrational distinction from the realm of ideal theory to
the realm of practice. If this distinction is particularly beyond the
ken of either public officials or the population at large, then the
slippage from ideal theory into practice may be greater than the
slippage normally expected when an abstract formulation is applied to more concrete situations.
To suggest merely that a concept is elusive, or even that it is
particularly elusive, is not sufficient. If that were the whole matter, one could expect that official mistakes of taking the nonrational to be rational would be counterbalanced by an equivalent number of mistakes of taking the rational to be nonrational. Of course,
this is not the case. Although few religious people would deny the
extent to which some aspects of religion simply must be taken on
faith, I still feel confident in asserting that, for most people, the
designation "rational" has positive emotive connotations and the
designation "nonrational" is largely pejorative. If this is true, then
the mistakes of underinclusion and the mistakes of overinclusion
are unlikely to cancel each other. Note, however, that the skewing

8. As Justice Story noted: "It is always a doubtful course, to argue against the use or
existence of a power, from the possibility of its abuse." Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 304, 344 (1816). More than a century later, Justice Holmes observed: "The power to
tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits." Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex
rel. Knox , 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
9. Perry, Comments on "The Limits of Rationality and the Place of Religious conviction:
Protecting Animals and the Environment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1067 (1986).
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cuts against the likelihood of the feared dangers. If rationality is
taken to be good, and nonrationality to be bad, then embodying
this distinction in a message to public officials that they may properly consider religious factors with reference to the nonrational
realm of their actions, but not with reference to the rational realm,
is likely to reduce the likelihood of going from the instant case to
the danger case. If the message is that religious factors are appropriate only in the realm of the nonrational, and if the recipients of
the message are likely to undercount the instances of the nonrational, then there is no reason to be especially afraid that officials will
take Professor Greenawalt's message as a signal to "incorporate"
the religious more than he would desire. As a result, focusing on
the distinction between the rational and the nonrational does not
justify fears of a particular risk of sliding from the instant case to
any of the feared danger cases.
IV.
The inquiry, however, does not end here. Although there is no
reason to suppose that any weakness in the linguistic boundary between the rational and the nonrational will result in excess reliance
on religion by public officials, other factors bear consideration. The
issue is the effect on the recipients of a message-a publicly stated
norm of behavior-that it is permissible to rely on the religious
with respect to nonrational determinations. The key categories
within this message are those of the nonrational and the religious.
The category of the nonrational turns out to be nonproblematic. In
order to scrutinize the possible effects of telling public officials
that, with respect to some determinations, they may rely on religious factors, however, the category of the religious still must be
investigated.
The hypothesis here is that the category of the religious, or the
category of justifiable reliance on religion, will be interpreted as
being larger than it is because of something peculiar to religion.
This "something" plainly encompasses many possibilities, but a
few bear mentioning. One is the possibility that electoral forces in
some areas are likely to weigh disproportionately in favor of more
rather than less religious involvement. If the electorate does desire
substantially greater religious involvement than is desirable as a
matter of ideal theory, and if electoral approval is especially
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important to the performance of some public officials, then there
may be substantial pressures on public officials to interpret overly
broadly rather than overly narrowly the realm within which they
may properly take religion into account.
More importantly, the message that public officials may take religious convictions into account in exercising their official responsibilities will be a message that is relevant only to religious public
officials, and those officials will be presented with two subdivisions
of the world. One is the subdivision between the rational and the
nonrational according to the public norm of official behavior. The
other is the division between what is within the purview of religion
and what is not, according to the religion to which the official subscribes. If the two subdivisions coincide, problems are unlikely; the
realm of what is to be rendered unto Caesar and the realm of what
is to be rendered unto God will be identical under both the norm
of official behavior and the officials' own religious views. As a result, officials can follow their religious convictions to the limit
while not violating the norm of official behavior. Similarly, no
problems will occur if according to the particular religion the
proper scope of religious involvement is smaller than that allowed
by the norm of official behavior; again, officials can follow the dictates of their religion to the limit without violating the norm.
The problems arise with respect to those religions in which the
proper scope of religious involvement in public life is larger than
that permitted under the norm of official behavior. If, according to
a particular religion, the area of religious determination includes
some or all of what the norm would designate as "rational" and,
therefore, not proper for religious involvement, then the norm will
allow officials to take into account only some of what their religion
would have them take into account. At this point, the question becomes one of determining whether a particular religion has, in effect, a "severability clause," making this kind of division possible,
or whether the actual effect on the officials of saying that some
religious considerations are relevant will be to say that all religious
considerations are relevant.
I am discussing the extent to which a norm of official behavior
that addresses only the instant case will lead, in practice, to the
danger case, despite the fact that the norm purports to distinguish
the two. In effect, the argument concerns the ability of a norm to
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distinguish factors that might be assimilated in some other and
larger world.10 If that larger world would assimilate the instant
case and the danger case, in terms of its political, social, linguistic,
or cultural categories, then there are limits on the ability of a legal
or other norm to cleave that assimilation, no matter how internally
logical and justifiable the cleavage may be.
The question is not so much whether all of the larger world
would assimilate the instant case and the danger case, but whether
this assimilation exists in the minds, beliefs, and behavior of those
officials who are the addressees of the norm. If that assimilation
exists prior to announcement of the norm, then officials may have
difficulty accepting the norm. If the prior assimilation comes from
the religious beliefs of those to whom the norm is addressed, then
the degree of resistance to what will be perceived as an artificial
distinction will be even greater. Whether this is the case will vary
from religion to religion; thus, examining the actual empirical likelihood of what I suggest here is not possible in these pages. If my
guess is correct, however, then the nature of religious belief, and
the hold that religious belief has on many people, is such that it
may be particularly likely that the distinction between the instant
case and the danger case will not be valid for them. If so, the risks
of moving from the instant case to the danger case will be especially large, and this will constitute an argument for not taking the
step to the instant case, however small that step may appear at
first.
V.
In an important sense the analysis thus far has avoided the full
reach of nonideal theory. We must deal with the fact that, regardless of what the norm of official behavior is, public officials will
take their own religious convictions into account in performing
their official duties. They may not always do so, but it is absurd to
suppose that they have never done so with some frequency, that
they do not now do so with some frequency, and that they will not
always do so with some frequency.
10. I discuss the relationship between legal assimilative categories and the assimilative
categories of the larger world at greater length in Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571
(1987).
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The question is thus one of determining how to confront the inevitable, in an area in which, to some or many, the inevitable
might be assimilated with something perceived as quite dangerous.
At this point two strategies present themselves. The first might be
called the strategy of accommodation. Under this strategy one
confronts the inevitable by allowing it, hoping in the process that
what is allowed will satisfy the desires of those about whom one is
concerned. This strategy runs the risk that the message of allowance will be taken as saying substantially more than it actually
says, or allowing more than it actually allows. In exchange for this
risk, however, this strategy maintains the authority or legitimacy
of the norm structure at issue because, by allowing the inevitable,
the inevitable need not violate the norm structure in order to exist.
Contrasted with the strategy of accommodation is the strategy
of resistance. Under this strategy, fearful of the dangers attendant
to expansion of the inevitable, one says "no" even to the inevitable. In doing so, one recognizes that this will involve some violation
of the norm and thus some weakening in the authority of the norm
structure as a whole, but this risk is accepted to minimize the likelihood of expansion beyond the inevitable. If the norm is perceived
as unrealistic, however, it may break down entirely. People who
perceive the fourth amendment as freeing murderers may lose all
faith in that amendment, and people who see the free speech
clause of the first amendment as protecting Nazis and Klansmen
may refuse to accept the norm of freedom of speech. So too with
religion. If people see freedom of religion, whether as political
norm or constitutional directive, as prohibiting what is both desirable and inevitable, then freedom of religion may simply drop out
of the public decisionmaking process. The strategy of resistance,
however, is premised on the assumption that in some areas these
dangers are less than the dangers accompanying official permission
to engage in what is at least suspect. If official toleration of the
suspect occurs, the fear is that this will be taken as implicit, if not
explicit, permission to go one step further."
11. Consider from this perspective Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Although disturbing, perhaps reactions similar to those that prompted the internment of the
Japanese-Americans never can be expected to disappear, and during time of war or national
hysteria the courts will behave exactly the way they did in Korematsu. The mere fact that
courts will fold under pressure, however, does not dictate that they should be told that they
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Whether the fears grounding the strategy of resistance are
greater than the fears grounding the strategy of accommodation
will vary from problem area to problem area. One possible interpretation of Professor Greenawalt's "small step" is to say that he
has adopted a strategy of accommodation to the inevitable. This
may be the wisest course, but I have tried to suggest here that an
alternative strategy may exist that must be explored. Resisting the
inevitable is not to be desired because it will prevent the inevitable, but because it may be the best strategy for preventing what is
less inevitable but more dangerous. If official reliance on religious
conviction poses these dangers, the strategy of resistance ultimately may be the safest course.

may fold under pressure, because the effect of the message may be to increase the likelihood
of folding even when the pressure is less. Moreover, stating a norm that is
unlikely to be followed still may have some effect, in the long run, on what is or is not
inevitable. For an application of this latter perspective to the free speech clause, see Blasi,
The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 449 (1985).

